Minisymposium (ID: SS-SCT)
Social Choice Theory
Organizers: D. Marc Kilgour (Wilfrid Laurier University) and Marcus Pivato (Trent
How should a group of people make a collective decision? Elect a government?
Divide a common resource? Match claimants to indivisible resources? Aggregate
individual judgements into a logically consistent consensus? Combine private
information in an epistemically optimal way? Negotiate an agreement?
Many rules have been proposed to produce collective decisions, but their
appropriateness has been debated. Is the implementation of a rule
computationally complex? Is the rule susceptible to manipulation, and if so
how complex is that manipulation? Is the rule vulnerable to paradox and
inconsistency? If a rule is internally consistent, socially efficient, and
procedurally fair, is that enough? Or should it instantiate some theory of
social justice? Can the conflicting norms of welfare, fairness, and collective
rationality ever be reconciled? These are some of the questions that the
mathematical theory of social choice seeks to answer.
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